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Introduction
The UK Ministry of Defence defines interna-
tional intervention as ‘the projection of mili-
tary force (augmented by other agencies as 
required) outside the UK sovereign territory 
to achieve an effect in securing, protecting or 
promoting UK national interest through the 
use or threat of force’ (House of Commons 
Defence Committee 2014: 13, paragraph 6). 
A report from the UK House of Commons 
Defence Committee suggests that this defini-
tion is too narrow and should be broadened 
to include intervention for humanitarian 
purposes. For both the Ministry of Defence 
and the Defence Committee, interventions 
are ‘naturally’ about the military.
The notion that interventions are ‘military 
interventions’ is also apparent in public and 
policy debates. Arguments about interven-
tions presuppose specific ideas about the 
nature of the ‘military.’ For those in favour of 
intervention, ‘the military’ is assumed to be 
an instrument that can be used when other 
political or economic tools have failed to 
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rity gap’ captures the particular relationship or the distinct kind of ‘mismatch’ 
between objectives and practices as it occurs in a ‘security culture.’ This reading 
of international interventions through the concept of ‘security culture’ and the 
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goes beyond simplistic assumptions both about traditional military capabilities and 
the role of the ‘international community’ as a unitary actor.
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change regimes or defeat insurgencies or to 
protect people from large-scale human rights 
violations. For those against intervention, 
the use of ‘the military’ is assumed to lead 
to death and destruction and escalation. The 
consequence is an impasse, a polarisation of 
debate, in which preset assumptions about 
the ‘military’ determine the standpoint. More 
importantly, it obscures discussions about 
the complex reality of situations. Rather than 
investigating and addressing the difficult 
and heart rending problems on the ground 
in places like today’s Iraq or Syria, debates 
are over laid by the general question about 
whether or not to use military force based on 
preset assumptions about what this means. 
The narrowness in the public debate is 
similarly apparent in the scholarly litera-
ture, in which intervention is also commonly 
assumed to be about the use of military 
force. The academic debate about inter-
vention tends to be couched in normative 
terms relating to issues of sovereignty, the 
authority to use force, and human rights 
(see, for example, Hehir 2010; Weiss 2007). 
Contributions to this literature are guided 
by distinct theoretical standpoints, such 
as a liberal, critical or realist understand-
ing of the political world. The pre-analytical 
commitments, which are implied in these 
worldviews, in effect determine the indi-
vidual scholar’s normative position towards 
international interventions—again where the 
military aspect of interventions is taken for 
granted even where it is criticised. Thus real-
ists tend to assume that military force should 
be used in the national interest while liber-
als are divided between those who favour 
intervention for humanitarian purposes and 
those critical thinkers who oppose all forms 
of intervention—naturally understood as mil-
itary interventions.
A related stream of the scholarly literature 
is about the effects of intervention at local 
levels—having to do with state-building, 
peace-building, democracy promotion and 
so on. For some scholars, something called 
the ‘international community’ is treated as 
a given, a neutral outsider, to whom policy 
recommendations can be addressed. The lit-
erature is full of varied and valuable criticism 
of what ‘the international community’ does 
or does not and should do or should not do. 
Yet, there is a shared presumption that the 
failures have to do with inefficiencies, lack of 
coordination, and lack of knowledge (for an 
overview, see Newman, Paris and Richmond 
2009). On the other hand, critical scholars 
tend to treat the international community 
as a Western neo-colonial enterprise. What 
is missing in both sets of literature is an 
understanding of (potential) different types 
of intervention and the degree to which local 
societies are enmeshed in wider global social 
relations.
There is, therefore, a shortcoming in the 
existing scholarship about international 
interventions. Among those concerned 
with military intervention, there is very lit-
tle discussion about what the word ‘military’ 
implies. Are we talking about air strikes or 
war-fighting? Or can we mean peacekeeping 
and policing? Are all of these types of inter-
vention lumped together? At the same time, 
those concerned with local impact rarely 
delve into the nuances of what is meant by 
‘international.’ Especially in the aftermath 
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
exchange of positions has reached a cul de 
sac. Those who argue that humanitarianism 
is a cover for geo-political ambition have 
pointed to the experience of those wars as 
vindication of their position. At the same 
time, those who favour humanitarian inter-
vention have pointed to the tragedies of 
Srebrenica, Rwanda and now Syria to decry 
the perils of doing nothing. 
The aim of this article is to contribute to 
an opening of the scholarly engagement with 
the issue of international interventions in a 
way that takes into account the reality of con-
temporary interventions as complex political 
actions. In order to do this, the article pro-
poses an alternative way of understanding 
and, consequently, assessing international 
(‘military’) interventions. Given the observation 
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that interventions these days have come to be 
closely linked to the notion of ‘security,’ the 
article proposes to conceptualise them as ‘secu-
rity interventions’ and apply an alternative set 
of conceptual tools in their analysis. 
Grounded in an engagement with the 
loaded notion of ‘security’ and how it is 
treated in Security Studies, the article con-
ceptualises ‘security’ as being about both an 
objective and a practice. This take on ‘secu-
rity’ leads to the development of two inter-
linked concepts. The first concept is called 
‘security culture.’ Through the concept of 
‘security culture’ it is recognised that ‘secu-
rity,’ i.e. objectives and practices, differs in 
each context that it is applied. The concept 
of ‘security culture’ then captures specific 
combinations of objectives and practices. 
The second concept that the article devel-
ops out of the understanding of ‘security’ as 
being about objectives and practices is called 
‘security gap.’ It captures the particular rela-
tionship (or one could say, a specific kind of 
‘mismatch’) between objectives and practices 
as it occurs in a particular context, i.e. in a 
particular ‘security culture.’ 
Thus the article puts forward an under-
standing of interventions as political action, 
which is the product of a distinct (interplay 
of) ‘security culture(s)’ in and through which, 
inevitably, a specific ‘security gap’ plays out 
on the ground. The article suggests that an 
approach to international (‘military’) inter-
ventions through this lens, i.e. understood 
as ‘security interventions,’ helps to open 
scholarly pathways into critical studies and 
assessments of contemporary interventions 
beyond the entrenched structures of the 
existing scholarship.
The loaded nature of ‘security’
Assuming that political discourses play into 
and come out of political practices, it is 
apparent that the notion of ‘security’ plays 
an important role in the context of con-
temporary international interventions. For 
instance, US President Obama makes it clear 
that a potential US intervention into the 
conflict in Syria builds on the understanding 
that ‘the actions of the Government of Syria 
in supporting terrorism, maintaining its 
then-existing occupation of Lebanon, pursu-
ing weapons of mass destruction and missile 
programs, and undermining U.S. and interna-
tional efforts with respect to the stabilization 
and reconstruction of Iraq’ constitute an ‘unu-
sual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the 
United States’ (White House 2013; emphasis 
added). The former German Defence Minister 
Peter Struck (2002) argued that it was the 
security of Germany that German soldiers 
are defending at the Hindu Kush. The EU 
explains in its Report on the Implementation 
of the European Security Strategy (Council of 
the European Union 2009: 18) ‘that Europe 
has security interests beyond its immediate 
neighbourhood. In this respect, Afghanistan 
is a particular concern’; justifying its engage-
ment with its ‘Eastern neighbours,’ it further 
stresses, ‘the goal is to strengthen the pros-
perity and stability of these countries, and 
thus the security of the EU’ (Council of the 
European Union 2009: 23). ‘British troops 
are fighting in Afghanistan, alongside our 
US and other allies, to protect our national 
security,’ explain David Cameron and Nick 
Clegg (Cabinet Office 2010: 13; emphasis 
added). And President Putin said on signing 
the treaty to annex Crimea to Russia that 
Crimea is ‘vital to Russian security’ (Wall 
Street Journal 2014). 
While there has been much discussion 
about the increased relevance of ‘security’ 
and its spread into all kinds of discourses, 
such as the discourse about the environ-
ment, food, climate, and so on, the relevance 
of ‘security’ in the specific context of inter-
national interventions has not yet been 
explicitly noted, let alone discussed. This is 
problematic in two respects. 
First, by overlooking the relevance of the 
notion of ‘security,’ impact assessments of 
international interventions run the danger 
of not taking into account the criteria that 
in effect guide a respective intervention. For 
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example, the assessment of an international 
intervention from within the context of 
‘peace building’ is misguided if it overlooks 
the fact that the aim of interventions these 
days is to secure the (national) security of 
those who intervene. Hence, acknowledging 
the significance of ‘security’ means acknowl-
edging an integral empirical aspect of such 
interventions, the way they are framed and, 
consequently, speaking the ‘same language’ 
that guides interventions. 
Second, by overlooking the relevance of the 
notion of ‘security’ in and for international 
interventions, a highly loaded discourse is 
overlooked. Putting it the other way around, 
acknowledging international interventions as 
security interventions means taking seriously 
their profoundly political character, which 
comes with the loaded notion of ‘security.’
The increasing relevance of ‘security’ in 
and for contemporary international military 
interventions is part of a broader trend, in 
which the notion of ‘security’ is used to shape 
an expanding range of policies and political 
practices. As Christopher Daase (2010) puts it, 
since the middle of the last century ‘security’ 
has become the ‘gold standard’ of national 
and international politics, having outplayed 
the concept of ‘peace’ in strategy debates and 
political programmes (see also Bonss 2009; 
Buzan and Hansen 2009). An ever grow-
ing number of issues, increasingly broadly 
defined, are treated as ‘security’ issues; con-
cepts such as ‘environmental security,’ ‘energy 
security’ and ‘food security’ have become 
commonplace. At the same time, the idea of 
the object of ‘security’ has widened, from a 
narrow focus on the (nation)state to the indi-
vidual human, to society, or to the planet (see 
especially Buzan and Hansen 2009). 
The loaded nature of ‘security’ has been 
widely acknowledged and discussed in 
comprehensive and sophisticated ways (e.g. 
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998; Dillon 
1996; Zedner 2009; Buzan and Hansen 
2009). The literature draws attention to 
three aspects of this ‘loadedness.’
First and most obviously, ‘security’ 
shares with all other concepts that it is not 
ahistorical; it is a social product and, as such, 
inherently political. As a referent, ‘security’ 
is not a fixed, a priori existing object or fact 
but—as Michel Foucault (e.g. 1990) explains 
is the case for all referents—constitutes the 
discursively produced and reproduced laws/
orders/rules that permit and restrict the 
ways in which objects and facts are related 
to each other. As a signifier, security is inex-
tricably enmeshed in and the product of the 
endless ‘play of signifying references that 
constitutes language’ (Derrida 1976: 7), as 
well as, the outcome of the ‘discursive polic-
ing’ (Foucault 1981: 61) that restricts what is 
sayable. 
Second, beyond this general aspect that is 
valid for all concepts and all signifiers, ‘secu-
rity’ is distinctly enmeshed with the idea of 
the state and/or political authority and, in 
fact, with the very thinking that constitutes 
modern politics and its practices. It is this 
enmeshment that makes ‘security’ peculiar 
and implies the imperative to take it seri-
ously. ‘Security’ is constitutive of (the idea of) 
the state—in fact, it is ‘security’ that legiti-
mises the state. This means that providing 
‘security’ is not only a fundamental role of 
the state but something that constitutes it. 
Hence, policies and practices under the label 
of ‘security,’ such as contemporary interna-
tional interventions, are in one way or other 
and for better or worse also always part of the 
‘securing’ of the state or, potentially, other 
forms of political authority (e.g. Dillon 1996). 
Implied in this is the idea that the means to 
provide ‘security’ inevitably produces ‘insecu-
rity’; otherwise there would be no need for 
political authority.
Third, there is a particular ‘power’ inherent 
in the idea of ‘security’ that is linked to and 
comes out of a notion of the ‘state of emer-
gency.’ As the Copenhagen School (Buzan, 
Waever and de Wilde 1998: 23) shows, the 
invocation of ‘security’ can be seen as an 
‘extreme form of politicization’ as it lifts 
issues beyond the sphere of ‘normal politics’ 
into the sphere of ‘security.’ In other words, 
through the invocation of ‘security,’ an ‘emer-
gency condition’ is declared and the right 
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is claimed ‘to use whatever means are nec-
essary to block a threatening development’ 
(Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998: 21). This 
makes the notion of ‘security’ and its invoca-
tion particularly powerful. As Lucia Zedner 
(2009: 12) puts it, ‘security has all the quali-
ties of a fire engine, replete with clanging 
bells and flashing lights, whose dash to avert 
imminent catastrophe brooks no challenge, 
even if it risks running people down on the 
way to the fire.’
‘Security’ as objective and practice 
It is because of the loaded nature of the 
notion of ‘security’ that security’s explicit 
role in the context of international interven-
tions needs to be taken seriously. This is not 
a straightforward task, though. How is one 
to deal with the complex notion of ‘security’ 
for this purpose? How is one to operation-
alise it in an attempt to reconceptualise 
international interventions? The existing 
Security Studies literature offers two basic 
approaches to ‘security,’ ‘security’ as an objec-
tive to be achieved and ‘security’ as a practice. 
Both approaches to ‘security’ are valuable in 
their own terms. However, for the purposes 
of grasping the reality of international inter-
ventions, understood as ‘security interven-
tions,’ an idea of ‘security’ as a combination 
of both is needed.
The first approach takes ‘security’ as an 
objective to be achieved. Assessing interna-
tional interventions as ‘security interven-
tions’ would then mean taking them as a 
practice designed to achieve the objective 
‘security,’ however that is defined. Such an 
understanding of intervention could be 
assessed in three possible ways. First, an 
intervention could be assessed in terms of 
whether it achieves ‘security’ as the objective 
the intervention sets out to achieve, say US 
or Russian national security. Second, an inter-
vention could be assessed with a critical view 
on the concept of ‘security’ it is following, i.e. 
it could be assessed in terms of the notions 
of ‘security’ that is held by the US or Russia. 
Third, it could be assessed through a ‘secu-
rity’ concept, for example human security 
that the researcher chooses independently 
from the one that informs the intervention. 
Undoubtedly, all three forms have the 
potential of bringing out valuable insights. 
Yet, the trouble with the application of this 
kind of understanding of ‘security’ is that 
assessments remain within the discourse 
of ‘security.’ As such, they do not take into 
account the complexity and political loaded-
ness that is so intrinsic to the concept. In the 
first case, ‘security,’ and indeed the specific 
idea of ‘security’ that informs the respective 
intervention, is accepted as an objective that 
could actually be achieved. In the second 
case, the assessment would be (but only) 
about the concept of ‘security.’ And in the 
third case, the assessment would be about 
one distinct (preset) idea of ‘security’ against 
another, e.g. ‘state security’ against ‘human 
security.’ 
Re-conceptualising international military 
interventions as ‘security interventions’ based 
on an understanding of ‘security’ as an objec-
tive to be achieved then means, for better or 
worse, to be caught by, play into and some-
what reinforce the fundamental enmesh-
ment of ‘security,’ the state and (modern) 
politics. Referring to Eriksson (1999), assess-
ments based on this basis are always ‘advoca-
tions,’ because whatever (critical) form they 
may take, they inevitably (discursively) sup-
port a thinking of (global) politics through 
‘security.’ Going another step further by tak-
ing up Dalby’s point, even every critical exten-
sion of the concept (beyond its state-centric 
historical focus) takes us away from exploring 
‘the possibilities of organizing global action 
around pressing issues such as poverty, devel-
opment, and environmental degradation 
without formulating them in terms of a secu-
rity framework where technocratic and mana-
gerial modes of governmentality are invoked 
in the absence of a more flexible political 
imagination’ (Dalby 1997: 25).
The second approach to be found in the 
existing literature takes ‘security’ as a prac-
tice. Arguments along these lines usually 
build on the work of the scholars that have 
come to be identified with the Copenhagen 
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School label (notably Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde 1998). According to this approach, 
‘security’ as a practice, is here seen as a speech 
act through which an issue is lifted into the 
realm of ‘security’ and out of the realm of 
‘normal politics.’ ‘Security’ becomes visible 
then as a ‘self-referential practice, because it 
is in this practice that the issue becomes a 
security issue—not necessarily because a real 
existential threat exists but because the issue 
is presented as such a threat’ (Buzan, Wæver 
and de Wilde 1998: 24). 
The advantage of this approach is that it 
avoids the trap of being caught up within 
and reinforcing the ‘security’ discourse, the 
way the first approach does. Yet, the trouble 
is that assessments of international interven-
tions along these lines would be about a very 
specific speech act and its social acceptance. 
Leaving aside the empirical challenges that 
empirical investigations face that try to be 
true to the theory of ‘securitization,’ such 
assessment would focus on a relatively spe-
cific and narrow kind of proclamation. In 
other words, it does almost the opposite of 
the ‘security as objective’-approach. By focus-
sing on the success of a speech act, the com-
plex socio-political processes, through which 
ideas of, in fact, the reality of ‘security’ are 
constructed, are left aside. 
This article proposes that for the purposes 
of approaching international interventions 
as ‘security interventions’ a conceptualisa-
tion of ‘security’ as both objective, i.e. about 
a specific idea of ‘security’ (whose ‘security,’ 
from what), and practice is useful, where the 
practice of ‘security’ is more than a speech 
act. The practice of ‘security’ is understood 
as being constituted by the interplay of a) 
a security apparatus, which consists of the 
military, police, and intelligence institutions, 
as well as concrete existing equipment and 
tools, and b) strategies and specific tactics 
that are the expression of political authority. 
Objectives and practices can never be per-
fectly aligned because inevitably practices 
produce ‘insecurity.’ 
The value of this proposed take on ‘secu-
rity’ is that it allows for the development of 
two interlinked conceptual tools that can 
serve a critical take on international inter-
ventions: the concept ‘security culture’ and 
the concept ‘security gap.’ 
The concepts ‘security culture’ 
and ‘security gap’
The first concept that can be developed out 
of the understanding of ‘security’ as being 
about objectives and practices is called ‘secu-
rity culture.’ Through the concept of ‘security 
culture,’ it is recognised that ‘security,’ i.e. 
objectives and practices, potentially differ 
in each context it is applied. The concept 
of ‘security culture’ then captures specific 
combinations of objectives and practices, 
which allows us to grasp the complex real-
ity of international interventions. The con-
cept ‘security culture’ captures the set of 
actions taken to secure whatever is taken to 
be secured, together with the set of institu-
tions that are designed to authorise, imag-
ine, plan, and implement these actions. 
Or, to put it another way, if we understand 
security both as an objective, a specific idea 
of ‘security’ (whose ‘security,’ from what), and 
as a practice undertaken by states or other 
political authorities, a ‘security culture’ refers 
to a particular combination of objectives and 
practices. A ‘security culture’ is characterised 
by a set of social relationships that have their 
own specific logics. 
The idea of a ‘security culture’ has some 
similarities to the concept of ‘strategic cul-
ture’ developed in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
to explain why the rational assumptions of 
nuclear planners did not necessarily explain 
actual strategic behaviour. For Colin Gray 
(1999: 131) strategic culture was defined as 
the ‘the persisting socially transmitted ideas, 
attitudes, traditions, habits of mind and pre-
ferred methods of operation that are more 
or less specific to a particular geographically 
based security community that has a unique 
historical experience.’
The concept of ‘security culture’ differs 
from the concept of ‘strategic culture’ in 
three respects. First the term ‘strategic’ spe-
cifically refers to the use of military; hence 
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the shift from strategic to security is in line 
with the shift from military to ‘security inter-
ventions.’ This is a point that Christopher 
Daase highlights who also uses the term 
‘security culture’ (Daase 2010). Secondly, in 
contrast to the concept of ‘strategic culture’ 
the notion of ‘security culture’ does not 
necessarily imply that cultures are national. 
The concept captures types of cultures that 
might spread beyond national borders, 
they are not geographically (pre)defined. 
Moreover, the concept of ‘security culture’ 
does not only capture state security policies 
and settings but the security policies and 
settings of international institutions like 
the European Union or the United Nations 
or to the security approaches of non-state 
or hybrid actors. Any one national security 
policy might be characterised by one or more 
security cultures. And thirdly, the concept of 
‘security culture’ is not a static or essential-
ist concept. This is in contrast to the concept 
of ‘strategic culture,’ which was developed 
from within a conservative discourse and was 
explained in terms of tradition, geography, 
and history, e.g. applying it to explain why 
Britain has such an attachment to maritime 
strategy. The concept of ‘security culture,’ in 
turn, recognises that cultures are constantly 
reproduced and it is by analysing the ways 
in which they are reproduced that it is, for 
instance, possible to discover whether spe-
cific cultures tend to be rigid and impervi-
ous to change or whether there are opening 
points, new pathways built into the logic of 
a security culture. Thus, ‘security culture’ is 
more about the categorisation of specific 
forms and logics rather than anchoring the 
concept to place and time. The latter appears 
to be anachronistic anyway given the blur-
ring of the boundaries of what might be 
called security communities in the context 
of globalisation.
The idea of ‘security culture’ proposed 
here has a closer parallel with Michel 
Foucault’s concept of dispositif, understood 
as ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble 
consisting of discourses, institutions, archi-
tectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific state-
ments, philosophical, moral and philan-
thropic propositions–in short, the said as 
much as the unsaid. [It is] the system of rela-
tions that can be established between these 
elements’ (Foucault 1980: 194–228). A ‘secu-
rity culture’ is a distinct way of exercising 
power. It constitutes a unity but not a total-
ity, and it is an important empirical question 
how ‘security cultures’ take their form, are 
reinforced and are naturalised.
The second concept that can be developed 
out of the understanding of ‘security’ as 
being about objectives and practices is called 
the ‘security gap.’ It is closely interlinked 
with the concept of ‘security culture,’ in fact, 
it helps us to comprehend a ‘security cul-
ture.’ The concept of ‘security gap’ captures 
the particular relationship, or ‘mismatch,’ 
between objectives and practices within a 
specific ‘security culture’ as it plays out in a 
distinct context. The concept of ‘security gap’ 
is based on the premise that there is inevita-
bly a gap between the objective of ‘security’ 
and the practices to achieve the objective. As 
suggested above, this is because ‘security’ in 
the dual sense that we have outlined, inevi-
tably produces ‘insecurity’—of course, more 
or less ‘insecurity’ depending on the context. 
The scale of the ‘security gap’ in the actu-
alisation of specific security cultures, i.e. a 
specific security intervention, is an empirical 
question. 
The ‘security gap’ can also be described in 
terms of the inherent gap between collec-
tive and individual security since practices 
are always collective and objectives can be 
both collective (e.g. national security) and 
individual (e.g. human security). Following 
political theorists and historians, such as 
Emma Rothschild (1995), what is at the 
heart of the concept of ‘security,’ no matter 
how it is defined and (strategically) used, is 
a particular idea of the relationship between 
collective and individual ‘security,’ including 
what is meant by ‘collective’ and ‘individual.’ 
What this relationship looks like is histori-
cal. It differs from one concept and applica-
tion of ‘security’ to another. It is the result 
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of normative premises, a manifestation of 
worldviews and of strategic goals coming out 
of them, e.g. it depends on what is under-
stood to be the main objective of ‘security,’ 
what is understood to be the ‘collective’ (e.g. 
the state, a community, a society, the world) 
and how the individual is perceived and 
positioned. 
Practices of security are, by their nature, 
collective since any combination of practices 
is the expression of specific forms of politi-
cal authority; for example, regular military 
forces are the external expression of nation-
states or blocs (like NATO and the former 
Warsaw Pact); policing is usually considered 
a domestic security practice accountable to 
states, municipalities, or regions; peacekeep-
ing is linked to international institutions like 
the United Nations and the African Union 
while private security actors are often but 
not always associated with informal or hybrid 
forms of authority.
Objectives can be defined both in terms 
of individual and collective security. Thus 
American national security could be defined 
in terms of the sum of the individual secu-
rity of Americans or to a collective notion—
‘the United States of America’—or to the 
sum of the security of individual Americans. 
While this needs further elaboration it can 
be argued that any specific security gap is 
intrinsic to the nature of political authority. 
A collectively defined objective lends itself to 
friend-enemy distinctions that are more in 
keeping with conservative and hierarchical 
conceptions of political order, while individ-
ualistic definitions of security are more likely 
to be linked to rights based forms of political 
authority. 
The argument has implications for the 
very meaning of intervention. The bounded 
nature of political authority linked to prac-
tices implies a distinction between inside 
and outside; intervention is thus the out-
side intervening inside. The security cultures 
approach allows for a blurring of inside/
outside since cultures are, of their nature 
transnational and give rise to global/local 
enmeshment.
Three ideal type ‘security cultures’ 
The understanding of ‘security’ and the two 
concepts presented above offer a toolbox 
for analysing international interventions as 
‘security interventions.’ This involves iden-
tifying different interventions as part of a 
specific ‘security culture’ or a combination 
of ‘security cultures’ that captures, frames, 
shapes and is shaped by the various compo-
nents it comprises. Thus it involves a shift in 
analysis from actors to cultures, from outsid-
ers to inside/outside, from specific national, 
international or sub-national interventions 
to different types of intervention. Each of 
these ‘security cultures’ has its own logics, 
the logics of escalation and persistence, for 
example, that can be understood in terms 
of the relationships between the various 
components. In particular, the extent to 
which practices are aligned with objectives 
underpins political authority and deter-
mines the degree of path dependence or the 
persistence of a culture and the difficulty of 
identifying alternative pathways. In order to 
further facilitate such an analytical empiri-
cal endeavour, a grid of three ideal or styl-
ised type ‘security cultures’ can be applied in 
and to the empirical field. These three ideal 
type ‘security cultures’ were generated from 
an empirical analysis of recent interventions 
through the concept of ‘security culture’: 
Ideal type 1: Geopolitics
The first ideal type ‘security culture’ can be 
called ‘geopolitics.’ This is the legacy of the 
Cold War. The dominant narrative is about 
great power contestation and the dominant 
tools are deployment and use of regular mili-
tary forces, economic sanctions and state-to 
state diplomacy. The objective is national 
security and the practices include the deploy-
ment of military forces so as to deter a future 
war against a ‘peer competitor’—Russia, 
China, or NATO depending on the perspec-
tive. A geo-political intervention could 
be justified in terms of ‘self-defence’ (Iraq 
and Afghanistan) or the defence of nation-
als abroad (Ossetia and Eastern Ukraine) 
or ‘counter-proliferation’ (preventing the 
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acquisition of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) by ‘rogue’ states) and would consist 
of classic war-fighting including air strikes. 
It might also include protecting spheres of 
influence or preserving the security of the 
Global Commons, including the Arctic or 
energy transportation routes from intrusions 
by a peer competitor. Geo-politics remains 
the dominant way of thinking and way of 
structuring capabilities among the major 
states and accounts for most defence spend-
ing as can be seen from a study of defence 
reviews. A sub type might be what has been 
described as ‘guerrilla geo-politics’ (Galeotti 
2014)—the sort of indirect intervention char-
acteristics of the Russian behaviour in cur-
rent eastern Ukraine or Iranian behaviour in 
Syria and Iraq. 
Ideal type 2: War on Terror
The second stylised ‘security culture’ can be 
called ‘War on Terror.’ Even though President 
Obama has abandoned the term, it is useful 
because it emphasises the use of military 
means and the idea of war-based security 
where the focus is the defeat of enemies 
but, unlike the geo-political model, the 
enemies are non-state actors. The events of 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) play a founda-
tional role in the concept, often compared to 
the role played by Pearl Harbour in the geo-
political model. The ‘War on Terror’ has arisen 
in response to what has been constructed as 
‘asymmetric threats’ (terrorism, insurgencies, 
and various types of contemporary largely 
non-state violence). These are not necessarily 
new; they were obscured during the Cold war 
period by the primacy of the Cold War. The 
‘War on Terror’ is statist rather than multilat-
eralist. Like geo-politics, the objective of the 
‘War on Terror’ is national (and sometimes 
global or regional) security but vis-à-vis the 
risk of terrorism rather than the threat of an 
armed attack by a foreign state. It is possible 
to distinguish two broad types of interven-
tion within the framework of the ‘War on 
Terror.’ One is the counter-insurgency model 
epitomised in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is 
about defeating insurgents and/or terrorists 
with military forces. There are, of course vari-
ants of counter-insurgency. Heavy-handed 
tactics as used by Russia, the Assad regime, 
the Americans in Vietnam or Israel in Gaza 
involve attacks on population centres where 
combatants are supposed to be hiding. The 
population security approach of the British 
in Malaya or of US General Petraeus in 
Baghdad in 2007 aims to separate the insur-
gents from the population and protect the 
population while attacking the insurgents. 
By contrast what might be called counter-
terror interventions focus on defeating the 
terrorists through intelligence and targeted 
killings usually from the air (the drone cam-
paign). This emerging version of the ‘War on 
Terror’ ‘security culture’ involves a new set of 
practices; a shift from the military to a com-
bination of intelligence agencies and private 
security contractors and the widespread use 
of new technologies for mass surveillance, 
cyber warfare and robotics. 
Ideal type 3: Liberal Peace
The third stylised type of security culture can 
be termed ‘Liberal peace,’ which is associated 
with the dramatic increase in multilateral 
interventions since the end of the Cold War. 
The difference between the Liberal Peace-
culture and the previous two cultures is the 
preoccupation with stability as opposed to 
(the defeat of) enemies. In principle, security 
is achieved through stability rather than by 
defeating an enemy. The objective in this case 
can be national, regional or global security. 
As in the other cultures types, there are of 
course various subtypes. They range from the 
more muscular Responsibility to Protect or 
humanitarian intervention, which involves 
using military forces to protect civilians from 
massive human rights abuses, often from 
the air (the classic examples are Kosovo and 
Libya, though interventions in Northern Iraq 
(1991), Somalia (1992), Sierra Leone (2001), 
Mali (2012) could count as well) through the 
deployment of peacekeeping troops usually 
under a United Nations mandate to uphold 
ceasefires and stabilise conflicts (probably 
the most extensive and numerous form of 
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intervention) to human security, focused on 
human rights and justice. The liberal peace 
culture also involves a new set of practices; 
a range of international agencies, private 
contractors, NGOs, or what Duffield calls 
a ‘strategic complex’ (Duffield 2006) and a 
variety of actions including reconstruction 
and state-building efforts.
Analysing Logics
Every ideal ‘security culture’ type is shaped by 
a specific ‘security gap,’ i.e. distinct mismatch 
between the objectives and the practices. It is 
the nature of the gap that explains the logic 
or pathway of any specific culture. Take for 
example, the evolution of the ‘War on Terror.’ 
The initial response to the events of 9/11 was 
to frame the response in an almost geopoliti-
cal way. The terrorist attacks were treated as 
an attack on the United States and the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq were framed as self-
defence. In both countries, the United States 
undertook conventional military invasions, 
albeit incorporating new technologies and, 
in the case of Afghanistan, relying on local 
proxies. It was difficult, however, to claim that 
the practices (conventional military force) 
achieved the objective (American national 
security) since resistance developed in both 
countries. The conventional approach, 
thereby, evolved into the counter-insurgency 
approach described above. At least in Iraq, 
this approach was (temporarily) rather suc-
cessful in dampening down violence; how-
ever it was extremely costly in terms of money 
and the lives of American soldiers. In other 
words, it produced a gap that was unsustain-
able and represented, if you like, a cul de sac 
in the evolution of the War on Terror. It was 
the Obama Administration that introduced a 
focus on what it called counter-terror (to dis-
tinguish it from counter-insurgency)—the cur-
rent version of the War on Terror. Air strikes 
and drone attacks are used to kill individual 
terrorists at long distance. This does not elim-
inate the terrorist threat; on the contrary, it 
may be the cause of new mobilisations. But 
any renewed mobilisation justifies further 
attacks. As long as there are rather few attacks 
on the American mainland, it does not matter 
if the terrorists multiply; what matters is that 
an American President is seen to be respond-
ing to terrorist attacks and thereby believed to 
be acting in the interest of American national 
security. It is a belief that is embedded and 
reproduced within the framework of the ‘War 
on Terror.’ Thus, in this latest version of the 
‘War on Terror,’ the practices and the objec-
tive are rather well aligned and this allows for 
escalation (as the terrorists multiply) and per-
sistence as the terrorists justify the budgets of 
those carrying out the air strikes and drone 
attacks. 
Conclusion: Conceptualising 
international interventions 
as ‘security interventions’
This article set out to open up the scholarly 
engagement with the issue of international 
interventions by acknowledging interna-
tional interventions as ‘security interven-
tions,’ as opposed to naturalising them as 
‘military interventions.’ This starting point 
meant to engage with the concept of secu-
rity. Based on a brief discussion of different 
approaches to ‘security,’ the article suggests 
taking ‘security’ as both an objective as well 
as a practice. This take on ‘security’ led to 
the development of two interlinked con-
cepts: ‘security culture’ and ‘security gap,’ as 
analytical tools to grasp the complexity of 
international interventions. The concept of 
‘security culture’ captures specific combina-
tions of objectives and practices. The concept 
of ‘security gap’ captures the particular rela-
tionship, or one could say, the distinct kind 
of ‘mismatch’ between objectives and prac-
tices as it occurs in a ‘security culture.’
Reconceptualising and approaching inter-
national military interventions as ‘security 
interventions’ and applying these two con-
cepts enables a scholarship that takes the 
complex reality of these interventions into 
account, takes seriously the recent relevance 
of ‘security,’ while avoiding being caught 
in the dilemma of dealing with ‘security’ as 
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‘advocacy.’ The reading of international inter-
ventions through the concept of ‘security 
culture’ and the interlinked analytical tool 
‘security gap’ makes it possible that the analy-
sis and understanding goes beyond the idea 
of traditional military capabilities. It also ena-
bles a more differentiated understanding of 
the international community; and avoids the 
simplification of treating the international 
community as a unitary actor. More impor-
tantly, perhaps it opens up the possibility of 
analysing the logic that underlies and brings 
out distinct kinds of interventions, as well as 
the methods of reproduction and/or change 
within ‘security cultures.’ 
In particular, the application of the con-
cept of ‘security gap’ provides a solid empiri-
cal ground, which enables researchers to 
point out mismatches between objectives 
and practices, which could then serve as the 
ground for normative arguments about what 
kind of ‘security gaps’ are desirable (e.g. from 
a human security perspective) and about 
what kind of ‘security’ intervention comes 
closest to the proposed ideal without having 
these normative premises already built into 
the object of analysis. ‘Objectives’ are deeply 
embedded in practices, which shape the way 
of thinking of security actors, as well as pow-
erful assumptions about political authority. 
This approach allows us to explain why, for 
example, air strikes are actually believed to 
be an appropriate response to a range of 
different problems, and continue to be the 
natural resort of politicians, despite the fact 
they may be rather ineffective when judged 
by criteria such as human security that are 
outside the framework of a specific security 
culture. 
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